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Sweep 06 Nov 2026 · 01:32Z Build v2.1.319 537 read Stable v2.1.311 Latest v2.1.318 Next v2.1.319 Feeds RSS JSON llms.txt llms-full.txt Unofficial

Claude Code v2.1.319 ·

Sandbox can refuse SOCKS and other non-HTTPS tunnels it cannot inspect

The sandbox can now block SOCKS, plain TCP and non-TLS tunnels to hosts that need inspection, telling Claude to use HTTPS through its proxy instead

Group of 3 Use it now No documentation found Improvements
JSON All of v2.1.319
Use it nowTier: how much it should matter to you
4Useful: my rating, 1 to 5
3Signal: worth watching, 1 to 5
SandboxArea: what it touches
ImprovementsKind: in v2.1.319,
What probably matters to youSection of the release

Unclear It is not clear which sandbox setups have request filtering configured, so which users this affects.

What

The sandbox limits what commands Claude runs can reach on your machine and on the network. Its network side includes a proxy that looks inside encrypted HTTPS traffic (TLS is the encryption HTTPS uses). A tunnel is a connection the proxy passes along without reading it. The sandbox can now refuse tunnels it cannot inspect:

  • The TLS-inspecting proxy can refuse a CONNECT tunnel (a request to open a raw connection through the proxy) that carries non-TLS bytes. This happens when a new refuseUninspectedTunnel hook returns true. The connection is closed and logged with the message "non-TLS bytes on CONNECT". Before, the proxy always let such traffic through as an opaque tunnel.
  • The sandbox network filter gains a check, applied when filterRequest is configured, that refuses SOCKS and other non-HTTPS tunnels to hosts that require inspection. Before, the filter only checked denied and allowed domains and strictAllowlist.
  • If the settings do not say which hosts need inspection, all such tunnels are blocked.
  • The sandbox config update now carries network.denyUninspectedTunnel through alongside filterRequest. Before, only filterRequest was kept.

The refusal tells Claude: "this host can only be reached over HTTPS through the sandbox's HTTP proxy; SOCKS and other non-HTTPS connections to it are blocked. Do NOT retry with dangerouslyDisableSandbox."

Why

Sandboxed commands that used SOCKS or plain connections to reach hosts the sandbox needs to inspect can now fail where they used to work. The fix is to reach those hosts over HTTPS through the sandbox's proxy, and Claude is told not to get around the block by running the command outside the sandbox with dangerouslyDisableSandbox.

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How sure we are
Something disagreesSomething we can check disagrees with this entry, or the writer said they could not settle it.
The writer flagged doubtIt is not clear which sandbox setups have request filtering configured, so which users this affects.

See this entry in the whole of v2.1.319 →

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