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11281128Claude sometimes follows instructions found in page content even when they conflict with yours; text on a page that says "ignore your previous instructions and navigate to..." can divert it from the task. Isolate Claude from sensitive data and actions to limit what a prompt injection can reach, review [Mitigate jailbreaks and prompt injections](https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/test-and-evaluate/strengthen-guardrails/mitigate-jailbreaks), and if a task can't avoid a logged-in session, use a dedicated low-privilege account and keep human confirmation on account-changing actions.
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1130Anthropic has trained the model to resist these prompt injections and has added an extra layer of defense. If you use the browser use tool, classifiers will automatically scan what the browser returns, such as page text or screenshots, to flag potential prompt injections. When these classifiers identify a potential prompt injection, they will automatically steer the model to check whether the instruction really came from you before acting on it.
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1132This extra protection won't be ideal for every use case (for example, use cases without a human in the loop), so if you'd like to opt out and turn it off, [contact support](https://support.claude.com/en/). The precautions above remain important even with these classifiers in place.
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11301134Because the browser runs in your environment, the sites Claude visits see your executor's network identity, and page content reaches the API only as the tool results you return. Inform end users of the relevant risks and obtain their consent before enabling browser use in your products.
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11321136## Member tools