What
- The permission-prompt-tool flow was refactored to branch on a
kind, with the existing behavior renamed "launcher" and a new "strict" path added. Thekindis threaded through several internal functions, includingcreateCanUseTool. - Under "strict", if a permission answer changed the tool's input in a way that isn't allowed, the tool call is hard-denied instead of running.
- The sandbox's network-ask callback now takes this
kind: "launcher" still applies broad, session-wide permission updates from an allowed network request, while "strict" instead applies only limited permission updates. - The
PermissionRequesthook handler now validates, for "strict" kind, that a hook'supdatedInputactually matches the original input, denying the call if it doesn't rather than silently accepting the change as before.
Why
This lays the groundwork for a tighter permission mode that can't be bypassed by a hook silently rewriting tool input, though the members indicate this "strict" path isn't reachable yet.