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Sweep 22 Sep 2026 · 15:52Z Build v2.1.280 501 read Stable v2.1.267 Latest v2.1.280 Next v2.1.280 Feeds RSS JSON llms.txt Unofficial
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Home Docs Claude Code CLI 12 Sep 2026
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Choose a sandbox environment changed

sandbox-environments

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2323| [Virtual machine](#virtual-machine) | Full operating system | No | High |
2424| [Claude Code on the web](#claude-code-on-the-web) | Full operating system, hosted by Anthropic | No | None; requires a Claude subscription, and GitHub when you launch from the web interface |
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26The [sandboxed Bash tool](/docs/en/sandboxing) is built into Claude Code and restricts only Bash commands. Built-in file tools, MCP servers, and hooks still run directly on your host. Every other approach in the table puts the whole Claude Code process inside the isolation boundary, so file tools, MCP servers, and hooks are restricted too.
26The [sandboxed Bash tool](/docs/en/sandboxing) is built into Claude Code and restricts Bash commands. Built-in file tools, MCP servers, and hooks still run directly on your host. Every other approach in the table puts the whole Claude Code process inside the isolation boundary, so file tools, MCP servers, and hooks are restricted too.
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2828<Warning>
2929 Sandbox isolation reduces the impact of a breach, but it does not eliminate risk. Any approach that allows network egress can still leak data the agent can read, and any approach that mounts your project directory writable can still modify that code. Review the [security limitations](/docs/en/sandboxing#security-limitations) before relying on a sandbox as a hard control.
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7171The per-command sandbox does not cover everything that runs in a session:
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7373* Other [built-in tools](/docs/en/tools-reference) such as Read, Edit, and WebFetch run inside the Claude Code process and do not spawn arbitrary code. [Permission rules](/docs/en/permissions) for path or domain gate them instead.
74* [MCP](/docs/en/mcp) servers and hooks are separate processes that run unconstrained on the host.
74* [MCP](/docs/en/mcp) servers and [command hooks](/docs/en/hooks#command-hook-fields) are separate processes that run unconstrained on the host.
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7676To put built-in tools, MCP servers, and hooks all behind one OS boundary, run the whole Claude Code process inside the [sandbox runtime](#sandbox-runtime), the [dev container](#dev-containers), or a [custom container](#custom-container).
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