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Sweep 22 Oct 2026 · 04:32Z Build v2.1.308 527 read Stable v2.1.308 Latest v2.1.308 Next v2.1.308 Feeds RSS JSON llms.txt llms-full.txt Unofficial

Claude Code v2.1.85 ·

Bash Tool Security Hardening

Entry
JSON All of v2.1.85
EntryKind: in v2.1.85,
ChangesSection of the release

Several new security checks have been added to the Bash tool's command validation, particularly for Windows/PowerShell:

  • WMI process spawning detection: Commands that "can spawn arbitrary processes via WMI/CIM (Win32_Process Create)" are now flagged for manual approval
  • Glob pattern symlink validation: "Glob patterns in paths cannot be statically validated — symlinks inside the glob expansion are not examined"
  • Archive + git exploit prevention: "Compound command extracts an archive and runs git. Archive contents may plant bare-repository indicators (HEAD, hooks/, refs/) that git then treats as the repository root"
  • Filesystem link creation blocking: "Compound command creates a filesystem link (New-Item -ItemType SymbolicLink/Junction/HardLink) — cannot auto-allow because path validation cannot follow just-created links"
  • New-PSDrive directory change detection: Added to the compound command directory-change check alongside Set-Location, Push-Location, and Pop-Location
  • Command length validation: Input length limits now measured in bytes with explicit error message
  • Windows archive tools: bsdtar.exe and gunzip.exe added to the allowed archive tool list
Evidence

WMI check (search for "can spawn arbitrary processes via WMI/CIM"), glob check (search for "Glob patterns in paths cannot be statically validated")

Strings lifted out of the shipped bundle, so the claim above can be checked against them.

See this entry in the whole of v2.1.85 →

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