Source Intelligence

DisclaimerUnofficial, and not affiliated with Anthropic. Nearly all of this is read straight out of what ships: npm bundles, captured prompts, published docs. Anthropic's own notes go in verbatim, marked as theirs. The rest is my reading, and every entry carries the strings behind it. If one looks wrong, vote it down and say why.

All of v2.1.63 Home All releases olderv2.1.62 v2.1.64newer
Claude Code v2.1.63

Enhanced Shell Security Checks

New Zsh-specific and general shell security checks for the Bash tool:

  • Zsh process substitution =() — detected and flagged
  • Zsh glob qualifiers with command execution (+ — detected and flagged
  • Zsh try/always constructs } always { — detected and flagged
  • Dangerous Zsh builtins (zmodload, zpty, ztcp, zsocket, zf_rm, etc.) — blocked
  • fc -e command detection — prevents arbitrary command execution via editor
  • Backslash-escaped operators — detects \;, \|, \&, \<, \> outside quotes that can hide command structure
  • Comment quote desync — detects quote characters inside # comments that can confuse quote tracking
  • Tilde expansion variants (~user, ~+, ~-) — require manual approval
  • Compound cd + git commands — flagged to prevent bare repository attacks
Evidence

Security check functions (search for "Zsh process substitution", "backslash-escaped operators", "comment quote desync", "fc -e")

Strings lifted out of the shipped bundle, so the claim above can be checked against them.

See this entry in the whole of v2.1.63 →