What probably matters to youSection of the release
What
A new environment variable, CLAUDE_GATEWAY_PROXY_IS_EGRESS_BOUNDARY, lets a gateway deployment tell Claude Code that all outbound network requests should be handed directly to an upstream HTTPS/HTTP proxy (the one set via HTTPS_PROXY/HTTP_PROXY), relying on that proxy's own allowlist. When this is active, Claude Code skips its own local DNS resolution and loopback/SSRF (server-side request forgery) safety checks and just passes hostnames straight through to the proxy.
This mode refuses to turn on, and logs a warning explaining why, in three cases:
This lets administrators who already enforce network restrictions at their proxy avoid redundant or conflicting checks from Claude Code itself, while the safeguards prevent the setting from silently weakening security in setups where no proxy is actually in place to do that job.
Two sources agreeTwo things we can check say the same as this entry.
Anthropic's release notes agreeAdded CLAUDE_GATEWAY_PROXY_IS_EGRESS_BOUNDARY=1 for Claude apps gateways whose only egress is a forward proxy: every outbound request hands…
The name it cites is new in this buildNew in this build: CLAUDE_GATEWAY_PROXY_IS_EGRESS_BOUNDARY
