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Sweep 06 Nov 2026 · 01:32Z Build v2.1.319 537 read Stable v2.1.311 Latest v2.1.318 Next v2.1.319 Feeds RSS JSON llms.txt llms-full.txt Unofficial

Claude Code v2.1.274 ·

Git subprocess environment hardened, with explicit control over terminal prompts

Git commands Claude Code runs internally are now locked down against unexpected network access and interactive prompts

Group of 3 You'll notice Improvements
JSON All of v2.1.274
You'll noticeTier: how much it should matter to you
2Useful: my rating, 1 to 5
1Signal: worth watching, 1 to 5
Git SecurityArea: what it touches
ImprovementsKind: in v2.1.274,
ImprovementsSection of the release

What

  • New, frozen sets of environment variables are applied to internal git invocations: GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL="none", GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH="1", GIT_NO_REPLACE_OBJECTS="1", GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT="0", and, unless SSH is explicitly allowed, GIT_SSH_COMMAND="false".
  • The internal git command-construction helper gained a new allowGitTerminalPrompt option; unless a call explicitly allows it, GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT is stripped from the environment passed to the git subprocess, whereas before it could pass through unfiltered.
  • Git push calls used internally (for worktree operations and plugin tag creation) now explicitly set allowGitTerminalPrompt: disabled for background worktree pushes, enabled for interactive plugin tag pushes.

Why

This reduces the risk of internal git commands silently reaching the network, replacing objects, or hanging on an interactive credential prompt, while still allowing prompts in the specific cases where a human is present to answer them.

See this entry in the whole of v2.1.274 →

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