A new check blocks reads that hide a '..' path segment behind a glob character to slip past directory restrictions
Claude Code can restrict file reads to specific working directories using permissions.blockReadsOutsideWorkingDirectories or an equivalent read-deny rule. A new check now detects when a path contains a .. segment (which moves up a directory) placed after a glob character, a wildcard the shell expands before Claude Code ever sees the final path, which could otherwise let such a path dodge the restriction check. When one of these directory-restriction settings is active, paths shaped this way are now denied outright with an explanation that the target couldn't be safely checked.
Without this check, a cleverly crafted path using a glob pattern could potentially bypass the read restriction and access files outside the intended working directory. Denying such paths outright closes that gap.
The entry above is what we published on the day. These lines were added later, as Anthropic's own pages caught up, and they sit beside the original rather than replacing it.
When you set it in a project's `.claude/settings.json` or `.claude/settings.local.json`, Claude Code honors it under the same [workspace trust rule as hooks in settings files](/docs/en/permissions#what-runs-before-you-trust-a-folder). Whil…memory see the edit
* Fixed Bash commands with two directory changes, a subshell, or a `cd`+`git` chain skipping the prompt under `permissions.blockReadsOutsideWorkingDirectories` in bypass and auto modechangelog see the edit
Anthropic's documentation has since written up blockReadsOutsideWorkingDirectories, on Claude Code changelog.