Your local message inbox publishes a key file so other sessions can prove who they are.
What's wrong with this entry?
The local socket other Claude Code processes use to send you messages now writes an auth key file and exports CLAUDE_CODE_MESSAGING_TOKEN to child processes. On platforms where auth is required, a failure to publish the key shuts the inbox down rather than accepting unauthenticated peers.
- The key file is written after the socket permissions are set.
- Shutdown in the hard-failure case is recorded with cause
key_publish_failed. - Where the platform treats auth as optional, the failure logs a warning and the inbox keeps running with peers sending unauthenticated.
refusing to run an inbox no peer can authenticate to
Strings lifted out of the shipped bundle, so the claim above can be checked against them.
Related
Other releases about the same thing. Found by shared names or similar wording; neither means one caused the other.
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v2.1.234
Messages injected by a host are classified separately from peer messages
Both mention cross
-
v2.1.234
Cross-session control requests check ids more carefully
Both mention cross
-
v2.1.234
Notice acks now wait for the record to persist
Both mention cross