Source Intelligence

DisclaimerUnofficial, and not affiliated with Anthropic. Nearly all of this is read straight out of what ships: npm bundles, captured prompts, published docs. Anthropic's own notes go in verbatim, marked as theirs. The rest is my reading, and every entry carries the strings behind it. If one looks wrong, vote it down and say why.

All of v2.1.223 Home All releases olderv2.1.222 v2.1.224newer

Peer messages carry a hop chain, with loop and runaway-relay rejection

You'll notice
Useful3 Signal0
Peer Messaging not in their notes

Messages passed between agents now track their relay path and get refused if they loop or bounce too far.

maxChainLengthmaxSelfHops
What

Messages relayed between agents now carry a hopChain of truncated HMAC-SHA256 session fingerprints, and admission control refuses chains that have grown too long or that have looped back through this session.

Details
  • the chain is threaded through the rendered peer-message block, the message origin record and the admission control path, over both UDS and bridge transports
  • a chain longer than maxChainLength (default 28) is refused as hop-runaway, runaway forwarding
  • a message already carrying this session's own tokens maxSelfHops (default 10) times is refused as hop-loop
  • both limits are settings-validated with min/max clamps, and rejections are reported with the sender identity, on top of the existing rate-limit and duplicate checks
Evidence

hop-runaway, peer relay chain is too long (runaway forwarding)

Strings lifted out of the shipped bundle, so the claim above can be checked against them.

See this entry in the whole of v2.1.223 →