You'll noticeTier: how much it should matter to you
3Useful: my rating, 1 to 5
0Signal: worth watching, 1 to 5
Peer MessagingArea: what it touches
New FeaturesKind: in v2.1.223,
New FeaturesSection of the release
What
Messages relayed between agents now carry a hopChain of truncated HMAC-SHA256 session fingerprints, and admission control refuses chains that have grown too long or that have looped back through this session.
Details
the chain is threaded through the rendered peer-message block, the message origin record and the admission control path, over both UDS and bridge transports
a chain longer than maxChainLength (default 28) is refused as hop-runaway, runaway forwarding
a message already carrying this session's own tokens maxSelfHops (default 10) times is refused as hop-loop
both limits are settings-validated with min/max clamps, and rejections are reported with the sender identity, on top of the existing rate-limit and duplicate checks
Evidence
hop-runaway, peer relay chain is too long (runaway forwarding)
Strings lifted out of the shipped bundle, so the claim above can be checked against them.
