Messages passed between agents now track their relay path and get refused if they loop or bounce too far.
What's wrong with this entry?
Messages relayed between agents now carry a hopChain of truncated HMAC-SHA256 session fingerprints, and admission control refuses chains that have grown too long or that have looped back through this session.
- the chain is threaded through the rendered peer-message block, the message origin record and the admission control path, over both UDS and bridge transports
- a chain longer than
maxChainLength(default 28) is refused ashop-runaway, runaway forwarding - a message already carrying this session's own tokens
maxSelfHops(default 10) times is refused ashop-loop - both limits are settings-validated with min/max clamps, and rejections are reported with the sender identity, on top of the existing rate-limit and duplicate checks
hop-runaway, peer relay chain is too long (runaway forwarding)
Strings lifted out of the shipped bundle, so the claim above can be checked against them.