Peer-machine isolation prompts now survive bypass permissions mode and are never auto-approved.
What's wrong with this entry?
Permission circuit breakers are now described by a trait table, which changes which of them survive bypass mode and which can be auto-approved by the classifier.
- each breaker maps to
{ bypassImmune, classifierRouted } - dangerousRemoval is both; backgroundOperator and suspiciousWindowsPath are classifier-routed only
isolatePeerMachines: { bypassImmune: !0, classifierRouted: !1 }, so peer-machine isolation prompts survive bypassPermissions mode and are never auto-approved by the classifier- call sites that tested
circuitBreaker === "dangerousRemoval"or justcircuitBreaker !== void 0now consult the traits - whether the isolatePeerMachines breaker fires at all is still controlled by the
isolatePeerMachinessetting
isolatePeerMachines: { bypassImmune: !0, classifierRouted: !1 }
Strings lifted out of the shipped bundle, so the claim above can be checked against them.
Related
Other releases about the same thing. Found by shared names or similar wording; neither means one caused the other.
-
v2.1.224
Cross-machine messages ask first when peer isolation is on
Both mention isolate peer machine