Page history
Security and data handling
claude-tag/concepts/security-and-data
History
claude-tag/concepts/security-and-data Changed · +12 / -10 lines
from line 1
# Security and data handling -> Claude Tag runs in an isolated sandbox where outbound traffic is default-deny and reaches only allowed hosts. Covers sandbox isolation, credential storage, network egress, service accounts, isolating credentials between channels and what one channel can reach, who can open a published artifact, and which members can invoke Claude. +> Claude Tag runs in an isolated sandbox that holds no credentials. Covers sandbox isolation, credential storage, network egress, service accounts, isolating credentials between channels and what one channel can reach, who can open a published artifact, and which members can invoke Claude. export const BetaNote = () => <Info>Claude Tag is in public beta. Features and behavior described here may change before general availability.</Info>;
from line 8
In channels, Claude acts under its own service accounts that an Owner provisions. By default it can read and post in Slack channels it's been added to and search public channels by keyword; it has no access to your external systems until an Owner adds connections. Each connection is scoped to specific channels and workspaces, and the actions Claude takes in connected tools are attributable to its own service accounts. -Every channel request, whether a person typed it or a schedule triggered it, follows the same path: it runs in a sandbox Anthropic hosts, leaves that sandbox only through Agent Proxy, and reaches your systems under the agent's own accounts. DMs run on the user's own claude.ai account instead and are covered separately on [How agent identity works](/docs/claude-tag/concepts/agent-identity#direct-message-channels). +Every channel request, whether a person typed it or a schedule triggered it, follows the same path: it runs in an isolated sandbox that holds no credentials. In an Anthropic-hosted environment, requests leave that sandbox only through Agent Proxy and reach your systems under the agent's own accounts. Sessions in a [self-hosted environment](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/self-hosted-environments) run on runners inside your network, and Claude can't use Access bundles in those sessions yet. +DMs run on the user's own claude.ai account instead and are covered separately on [How agent identity works](/docs/claude-tag/concepts/agent-identity#direct-message-channels). + ## How a request travels -Each Slack thread runs in its own sandbox, and every outbound call from that sandbox passes through the same checkpoints. +Each Slack thread runs in its own sandbox. In an Anthropic-hosted environment, every outbound call from that sandbox passes through the same checkpoints. -<img className="block dark:hidden" src="https://mintcdn.com/claude-ai/5JFKyLlO7sHMMf5J/images/claude-tag/diagrams/request-path.svg?fit=max&auto=format&n=5JFKyLlO7sHMMf5J&q=85&s=e8776cf0edd1f3ec912b9b044c9cc838" alt="Diagram showing the request path across three zones. A task mentioned in your Slack workspace runs in a session sandbox on Anthropic's infrastructure, one sandbox per thread, holding no credentials. Outbound requests pass to Agent Proxy, which injects the credential drawn from the credential store; a request matching no rule is blocked. Credentialed requests reach your systems, like GitHub, a data warehouse, monitoring, or any HTTP API. A dashed return path shows results posting back in the thread, as Claude." width="1000" height="440" data-path="images/claude-tag/diagrams/request-path.svg" /> +<img className="block dark:hidden" src="https://mintcdn.com/claude-ai/5JFKyLlO7sHMMf5J/images/claude-tag/diagrams/request-path.svg?fit=max&auto=format&n=5JFKyLlO7sHMMf5J&q=85&s=e8776cf0edd1f3ec912b9b044c9cc838" alt="Diagram showing the request path across three zones, labeled your Slack workspace, Anthropic's infrastructure, and your systems. A task mentioned in the Slack workspace runs in a session sandbox in the middle zone, one sandbox per thread, holding no credentials. Outbound requests pass to Agent Proxy, which injects the credential drawn from the credential store; a request matching no rule is blocked. Credentialed requests reach your systems, like GitHub, a data warehouse, monitoring, or any HTTP API. A dashed return path shows results posting back in the thread, as Claude." width="1000" height="440" data-path="images/claude-tag/diagrams/request-path.svg" /> -<img className="hidden dark:block" src="https://mintcdn.com/claude-ai/5JFKyLlO7sHMMf5J/images/claude-tag/diagrams/request-path-dark.svg?fit=max&auto=format&n=5JFKyLlO7sHMMf5J&q=85&s=a2ed5f3270989c3ed3d9b9a78a72bff0" alt="Diagram showing the request path across three zones. A task mentioned in your Slack workspace runs in a session sandbox on Anthropic's infrastructure, one sandbox per thread, holding no credentials. Outbound requests pass to Agent Proxy, which injects the credential drawn from the credential store; a request matching no rule is blocked. Credentialed requests reach your systems, like GitHub, a data warehouse, monitoring, or any HTTP API. A dashed return path shows results posting back in the thread, as Claude." width="1000" height="440" data-path="images/claude-tag/diagrams/request-path-dark.svg" /> +<img className="hidden dark:block" src="https://mintcdn.com/claude-ai/5JFKyLlO7sHMMf5J/images/claude-tag/diagrams/request-path-dark.svg?fit=max&auto=format&n=5JFKyLlO7sHMMf5J&q=85&s=a2ed5f3270989c3ed3d9b9a78a72bff0" alt="Diagram showing the request path across three zones, labeled your Slack workspace, Anthropic's infrastructure, and your systems. A task mentioned in the Slack workspace runs in a session sandbox in the middle zone, one sandbox per thread, holding no credentials. Outbound requests pass to Agent Proxy, which injects the credential drawn from the credential store; a request matching no rule is blocked. Credentialed requests reach your systems, like GitHub, a data warehouse, monitoring, or any HTTP API. A dashed return path shows results posting back in the thread, as Claude." width="1000" height="440" data-path="images/claude-tag/diagrams/request-path-dark.svg" /> | Checkpoint | The guarantee | | :----------- | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -| The sandbox | Runs on Anthropic's infrastructure and holds no credentials | +| The sandbox | Holds no credentials | | Agent Proxy | Injects credentials from the credential store at request time, and blocks traffic to unlisted hosts by default | | Your systems | See the agent's own accounts, so its actions there are attributable | ### Compute and the sandbox -Sessions run in sandboxes Anthropic hosts, the same managed compute behind [Claude Code on the web](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/web-quickstart). Each Slack thread gets its own sandbox. +Sessions run in ephemeral sandboxes, the same infrastructure that runs [Claude Code on the web](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/web-quickstart). Each Slack thread gets its own sandbox. When a thread goes quiet, its sandbox is released; replying in the thread builds a fresh one. What persists across that release and rebuild:
from line 49
### Network egress -Outbound traffic from a channel session's sandbox is default-deny. Requests go only to hosts an allow layer covers, and the layers are a [connection's Allowed websites](/docs/claude-tag/admins/connections/custom#fill-out-the-custom-tool-form), the [bundle's Domains tab](/docs/claude-tag/admins/add-connections#allow-a-host-without-a-credential), and the network access setting of the [environment](/docs/claude-tag/concepts/glossary#environment) the scope's sessions run on. A new environment's default level, Trusted access, already covers a [documented set of package registries and developer hosts](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/cloud-environments#default-allowed-domains). See [Agent Proxy](/docs/claude-tag/concepts/agent-identity#agent-proxy) for what happens to a request under each layer. +In an Anthropic-hosted environment, outbound traffic from a channel session's sandbox is default-deny. Requests go only to hosts an allow layer covers, and the layers are a [connection's Allowed websites](/docs/claude-tag/admins/connections/custom#fill-out-the-custom-tool-form), the [bundle's Domains tab](/docs/claude-tag/admins/add-connections#allow-a-host-without-a-credential), and the network access setting of the [environment](/docs/claude-tag/concepts/glossary#environment) the scope's sessions run on. A new environment's default level, Trusted access, already covers a [documented set of package registries and developer hosts](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/cloud-environments#default-allowed-domains). See [Agent Proxy](/docs/claude-tag/concepts/agent-identity#agent-proxy) for what happens to a request under each layer. -<img className="block dark:hidden" src="https://mintcdn.com/claude-ai/Tf9m3OvmKAZp3uXC/images/claude-tag/diagrams/proxy-decision.svg?fit=max&auto=format&n=Tf9m3OvmKAZp3uXC&q=85&s=a4aecacf4e23944d5a2ecaacf6cf95a1" alt="Flow diagram across two zones. Inside Anthropic's infrastructure, a session sandbox that holds no credentials sends every outbound request to Agent Proxy, which matches it against admin rules. Three outcomes branch toward your systems: on a rule match, the credential is attached at the boundary and the request proceeds; on an allowlist-only match, from the bundle's Domains list or the environment's network access setting, the request is sent without credentials; on no match, the request is blocked entirely (the default-deny outcome) and the host is unreachable." width="1000" height="400" data-path="images/claude-tag/diagrams/proxy-decision.svg" /> +<img className="block dark:hidden" src="https://mintcdn.com/claude-ai/Tf9m3OvmKAZp3uXC/images/claude-tag/diagrams/proxy-decision.svg?fit=max&auto=format&n=Tf9m3OvmKAZp3uXC&q=85&s=a4aecacf4e23944d5a2ecaacf6cf95a1" alt="Flow diagram across two zones, labeled Anthropic's infrastructure and your systems. In the first zone, a session sandbox that holds no credentials sends every outbound request to Agent Proxy, which matches it against admin rules. Three outcomes branch toward your systems: on a rule match, the credential is attached at the boundary and the request proceeds; on an allowlist-only match, from the bundle's Domains list or the environment's network access setting, the request is sent without credentials; on no match, the request is blocked entirely (the default-deny outcome) and the host is unreachable." width="1000" height="400" data-path="images/claude-tag/diagrams/proxy-decision.svg" /> -<img className="hidden dark:block" src="https://mintcdn.com/claude-ai/Tf9m3OvmKAZp3uXC/images/claude-tag/diagrams/proxy-decision-dark.svg?fit=max&auto=format&n=Tf9m3OvmKAZp3uXC&q=85&s=d2ad1dd61b859e9f2aebfceedbc247c3" alt="Flow diagram across two zones. Inside Anthropic's infrastructure, a session sandbox that holds no credentials sends every outbound request to Agent Proxy, which matches it against admin rules. Three outcomes branch toward your systems: on a rule match, the credential is attached at the boundary and the request proceeds; on an allowlist-only match, from the bundle's Domains list or the environment's network access setting, the request is sent without credentials; on no match, the request is blocked entirely (the default-deny outcome) and the host is unreachable." width="1000" height="400" data-path="images/claude-tag/diagrams/proxy-decision-dark.svg" /> +<img className="hidden dark:block" src="https://mintcdn.com/claude-ai/Tf9m3OvmKAZp3uXC/images/claude-tag/diagrams/proxy-decision-dark.svg?fit=max&auto=format&n=Tf9m3OvmKAZp3uXC&q=85&s=d2ad1dd61b859e9f2aebfceedbc247c3" alt="Flow diagram across two zones, labeled Anthropic's infrastructure and your systems. In the first zone, a session sandbox that holds no credentials sends every outbound request to Agent Proxy, which matches it against admin rules. Three outcomes branch toward your systems: on a rule match, the credential is attached at the boundary and the request proceeds; on an allowlist-only match, from the bundle's Domains list or the environment's network access setting, the request is sent without credentials; on no match, the request is blocked entirely (the default-deny outcome) and the host is unreachable." width="1000" height="400" data-path="images/claude-tag/diagrams/proxy-decision-dark.svg" /> Because requests to any other host are blocked, data can only leave the sandbox to hosts an allow layer covers. An admin sets the Allowed websites list on each connection and the Domains tab on each bundle. An admin sets the environment's network access level, which defaults to Trusted access, from the **Cloud environments** page in [admin settings](https://claude.ai/admin-settings). See [Set allowed websites](/docs/claude-tag/admins/add-connections#set-allowed-websites) and [Allow a host without a credential](/docs/claude-tag/admins/add-connections#allow-a-host-without-a-credential).
claude-tag/concepts/security-and-data Changed · +1 / -1 lines
from line 83
2. Keep the channel private. A bundle on a public channel [grants its access to anyone who joins](/docs/claude-tag/admins/attach-to-scope#attach-to-a-channel). 3. Check the channel's **Access summary** on the [Slack tab in admin settings](/docs/claude-tag/admins/attach-to-scope). It shows the access the channel actually gets, including what it inherits from the workspace and Default Slack access. -In a channel shared with another company, Claude replies only if the guest setting allows it, and then with channel-only access, so nothing inherited from the workspace or **Default Slack access** reaches the channel. See [Slack Connect channels](/docs/claude-tag/admins/restrict-access#externally-shared-channels). +Claude [doesn't operate in externally shared channels](/docs/claude-tag/admins/restrict-access#externally-shared-channels), so a channel shared with another company never has a session to isolate. Isolating a credential doesn't isolate what Claude knows. What it learns in a public channel becomes [workspace memory](/docs/claude-tag/users/memory) that sessions in the workspace's other channels can read, and it can [search public channels by keyword](/docs/claude-tag/admins/restrict-access#controls-that-aren%E2%80%99t-available) without being added to them, the same way any workspace member can.
claude-tag/concepts/security-and-data Changed · +1 / -0 lines
from line 100
## Related resources * [How agent identity works](/docs/claude-tag/concepts/agent-identity): the identity model in full, including DM attribution +* [Data lifecycle and deletion](/docs/claude-tag/concepts/data-lifecycle): what Anthropic stores, how long it's kept, and what each action deletes * [Restrict where Claude Tag operates](/docs/claude-tag/admins/restrict-access): the controls that exist and the ones that don't * [Audit Claude Tag activity](/docs/claude-tag/admins/audit): the trails for tracing what it did
claude-tag/concepts/security-and-data Changed · +1 / -1 lines
from line 83
2. Keep the channel private. A bundle on a public channel [grants its access to anyone who joins](/docs/claude-tag/admins/attach-to-scope#attach-to-a-channel). 3. Check the channel's **Access summary** on the [Slack tab in admin settings](/docs/claude-tag/admins/attach-to-scope). It shows the access the channel actually gets, including what it inherits from the workspace and Default Slack access. -Claude [doesn't operate in externally shared channels](/docs/claude-tag/admins/restrict-access#externally-shared-channels), so a channel shared with another company never has a session to isolate. +In a channel shared with another company, Claude replies only if the guest setting allows it, and then with channel-only access, so nothing inherited from the workspace or **Default Slack access** reaches the channel. See [Slack Connect channels](/docs/claude-tag/admins/restrict-access#externally-shared-channels). Isolating a credential doesn't isolate what Claude knows. What it learns in a public channel becomes [workspace memory](/docs/claude-tag/users/memory) that sessions in the workspace's other channels can read, and it can [search public channels by keyword](/docs/claude-tag/admins/restrict-access#controls-that-aren%E2%80%99t-available) without being added to them, the same way any workspace member can.
claude-tag/concepts/security-and-data Changed · +1 / -5 lines
from line 47
### Network egress -Outbound traffic from a channel session's sandbox is default-deny. Requests go only to hosts an allow layer covers, and the layers are a [connection's Allowed websites](/docs/claude-tag/admins/connections/custom#fill-out-the-custom-tool-form), the [bundle's Domains tab](/docs/claude-tag/admins/add-connections#allow-a-host-without-a-credential), and the network access setting of the [environment](/docs/claude-tag/concepts/glossary#environment) the scope's sessions run on. A new environment's default level, Trusted access, already covers a [documented set of package registries and developer hosts](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/cloud-environments#default-allowed-domains). Every request gets one of three outcomes: - -* **Matches a credential rule.** The credential is attached at the boundary and the request proceeds. -* **Matches only an allowlist.** The host is on the Domains tab or allowed by the environment's network access setting; the request is sent without credentials. -* **Matches nothing.** The request is blocked outright; the host is unreachable rather than merely unauthenticated. +Outbound traffic from a channel session's sandbox is default-deny. Requests go only to hosts an allow layer covers, and the layers are a [connection's Allowed websites](/docs/claude-tag/admins/connections/custom#fill-out-the-custom-tool-form), the [bundle's Domains tab](/docs/claude-tag/admins/add-connections#allow-a-host-without-a-credential), and the network access setting of the [environment](/docs/claude-tag/concepts/glossary#environment) the scope's sessions run on. A new environment's default level, Trusted access, already covers a [documented set of package registries and developer hosts](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/cloud-environments#default-allowed-domains). See [Agent Proxy](/docs/claude-tag/concepts/agent-identity#agent-proxy) for what happens to a request under each layer. <img className="block dark:hidden" src="https://mintcdn.com/claude-ai/Tf9m3OvmKAZp3uXC/images/claude-tag/diagrams/proxy-decision.svg?fit=max&auto=format&n=Tf9m3OvmKAZp3uXC&q=85&s=a4aecacf4e23944d5a2ecaacf6cf95a1" alt="Flow diagram across two zones. Inside Anthropic's infrastructure, a session sandbox that holds no credentials sends every outbound request to Agent Proxy, which matches it against admin rules. Three outcomes branch toward your systems: on a rule match, the credential is attached at the boundary and the request proceeds; on an allowlist-only match, from the bundle's Domains list or the environment's network access setting, the request is sent without credentials; on no match, the request is blocked entirely (the default-deny outcome) and the host is unreachable." width="1000" height="400" data-path="images/claude-tag/diagrams/proxy-decision.svg" />
claude-tag/concepts/security-and-data Changed · +1 / -1 lines
from line 99
## Member access -By default, anyone in a connected Slack workspace can invoke Claude in channels, with or without a Claude account. An Owner can turn on a restriction toggle to narrow that: on Team plans it limits Claude to people with a Claude account in your organization, and on Enterprise plans it limits Claude to members whose role grants the **Claude Tag in Slack** capability. See [Restrict who can use Claude](/docs/claude-tag/admins/restrict-access#members). The toggle governs DMs as well as channels. +By default, anyone in a connected Slack workspace can invoke Claude in channels, with or without a Claude account. An Owner can turn on a restriction toggle to narrow that: on Team plans it limits Claude to people with a Claude account in your organization, and on Enterprise plans it limits Claude to members whose role grants the **Claude Tag in Slack** capability. See [Restrict who can use Claude](/docs/claude-tag/admins/restrict-access#restrict-who-can-use-claude). The toggle governs DMs as well as channels. ## Related resources
claude-tag/concepts/security-and-data First recorded · 108 lines, first recorded
# Security and data handling ## How a request travels ### Compute and the sandbox ### Credential storage ### Network egress ### Service accounts ### Isolate credentials between channels ## Artifact visibility ## Member access ## Related resources
The first capture of this source. The page was already there, and this is what it said.
# Security and data handling > Claude Tag runs in an isolated sandbox where outbound traffic is default-deny and reaches only allowed hosts. Covers sandbox isolation, credential storage, network egress, service accounts, isolating credentials between channels and what one channel can reach, who can open a published artifact, and which members can invoke Claude. export const BetaNote = () => <Info>Claude Tag is in public beta. Features and behavior described here may change before general availability.</Info>; <BetaNote /> In channels, Claude acts under its own service accounts that an Owner provisions. By default it can read and post in Slack channels it's been added to and search public channels by keyword; it has no access to your external systems until an Owner adds connections. Each connection is scoped to specific channels and workspaces, and the actions Claude takes in connected tools are attributable to its own service accounts. Every channel request, whether a person typed it or a schedule triggered it, follows the same path: it runs in a sandbox Anthropic hosts, leaves that sandbox only through Agent Proxy, and reaches your systems under the agent's own accounts. DMs run on the user's own claude.ai account instead and are covered separately on [How agent identity works](/docs/claude-tag/concepts/agent-identity#direct-message-channels). ## How a request travels Each Slack thread runs in its own sandbox, and every outbound call from that sandbox passes through the same checkpoints. <img className="block dark:hidden" src="https://mintcdn.com/claude-ai/5JFKyLlO7sHMMf5J/images/claude-tag/diagrams/request-path.svg?fit=max&auto=format&n=5JFKyLlO7sHMMf5J&q=85&s=e8776cf0edd1f3ec912b9b044c9cc838" alt="Diagram showing the request path across three zones. A task mentioned in your Slack workspace runs in a session sandbox on Anthropic's infrastructure, one sandbox per thread, holding no credentials. Outbound requests pass to Agent Proxy, which injects the credential drawn from the credential store; a request matching no rule is blocked. Credentialed requests reach your systems, like GitHub, a data warehouse, monitoring, or any HTTP API. A dashed return path shows results posting back in the thread, as Claude." width="1000" height="440" data-path="images/claude-tag/diagrams/request-path.svg" /> <img className="hidden dark:block" src="https://mintcdn.com/claude-ai/5JFKyLlO7sHMMf5J/images/claude-tag/diagrams/request-path-dark.svg?fit=max&auto=format&n=5JFKyLlO7sHMMf5J&q=85&s=a2ed5f3270989c3ed3d9b9a78a72bff0" alt="Diagram showing the request path across three zones. A task mentioned in your Slack workspace runs in a session sandbox on Anthropic's infrastructure, one sandbox per thread, holding no credentials. Outbound requests pass to Agent Proxy, which injects the credential drawn from the credential store; a request matching no rule is blocked. Credentialed requests reach your systems, like GitHub, a data warehouse, monitoring, or any HTTP API. A dashed return path shows results posting back in the thread, as Claude." width="1000" height="440" data-path="images/claude-tag/diagrams/request-path-dark.svg" /> | Checkpoint | The guarantee | | :----------- | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | The sandbox | Runs on Anthropic's infrastructure and holds no credentials | | Agent Proxy | Injects credentials from the credential store at request time, and blocks traffic to unlisted hosts by default | | Your systems | See the agent's own accounts, so its actions there are attributable | ### Compute and the sandbox Sessions run in sandboxes Anthropic hosts, the same managed compute behind [Claude Code on the web](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/web-quickstart). Each Slack thread gets its own sandbox. When a thread goes quiet, its sandbox is released; replying in the thread builds a fresh one. What persists across that release and rebuild: * **Persists:** The thread, its visible work, and anything pushed to a branch, opened as a pull request, or posted into Slack. * **Does not persist:** Files that existed only inside the sandbox. To keep generated files, ask Claude to push them to a branch or post them in the thread. Claude Tag retains channel memory and session transcripts. Because of that retention, Claude Tag isn't available to organizations with Zero Data Retention (ZDR) enabled. ### Credential storage Credentials you provision are kept in a separate credential store, not in the proxy itself. When an outbound request matches a rule, [Agent Proxy](/docs/claude-tag/concepts/agent-identity#agent-proxy), the network layer between the sandbox and any external host, retrieves the credential from that store and injects it at the boundary, so the model and the sandbox are not given the key. This means: * **A saved credential is not displayed again.** The setup screens are write-only. * **The credential travels only to the hosts you named** when you added the connection. * **You can narrow the credential further**, to one host, one path prefix, or read-only methods, in [Add connections](/docs/claude-tag/admins/add-connections). ### Network egress Outbound traffic from a channel session's sandbox is default-deny. Requests go only to hosts an allow layer covers, and the layers are a [connection's Allowed websites](/docs/claude-tag/admins/connections/custom#fill-out-the-custom-tool-form), the [bundle's Domains tab](/docs/claude-tag/admins/add-connections#allow-a-host-without-a-credential), and the network access setting of the [environment](/docs/claude-tag/concepts/glossary#environment) the scope's sessions run on. A new environment's default level, Trusted access, already covers a [documented set of package registries and developer hosts](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/cloud-environments#default-allowed-domains). Every request gets one of three outcomes: * **Matches a credential rule.** The credential is attached at the boundary and the request proceeds. * **Matches only an allowlist.** The host is on the Domains tab or allowed by the environment's network access setting; the request is sent without credentials. * **Matches nothing.** The request is blocked outright; the host is unreachable rather than merely unauthenticated. <img className="block dark:hidden" src="https://mintcdn.com/claude-ai/Tf9m3OvmKAZp3uXC/images/claude-tag/diagrams/proxy-decision.svg?fit=max&auto=format&n=Tf9m3OvmKAZp3uXC&q=85&s=a4aecacf4e23944d5a2ecaacf6cf95a1" alt="Flow diagram across two zones. Inside Anthropic's infrastructure, a session sandbox that holds no credentials sends every outbound request to Agent Proxy, which matches it against admin rules. Three outcomes branch toward your systems: on a rule match, the credential is attached at the boundary and the request proceeds; on an allowlist-only match, from the bundle's Domains list or the environment's network access setting, the request is sent without credentials; on no match, the request is blocked entirely (the default-deny outcome) and the host is unreachable." width="1000" height="400" data-path="images/claude-tag/diagrams/proxy-decision.svg" /> <img className="hidden dark:block" src="https://mintcdn.com/claude-ai/Tf9m3OvmKAZp3uXC/images/claude-tag/diagrams/proxy-decision-dark.svg?fit=max&auto=format&n=Tf9m3OvmKAZp3uXC&q=85&s=d2ad1dd61b859e9f2aebfceedbc247c3" alt="Flow diagram across two zones. Inside Anthropic's infrastructure, a session sandbox that holds no credentials sends every outbound request to Agent Proxy, which matches it against admin rules. Three outcomes branch toward your systems: on a rule match, the credential is attached at the boundary and the request proceeds; on an allowlist-only match, from the bundle's Domains list or the environment's network access setting, the request is sent without credentials; on no match, the request is blocked entirely (the default-deny outcome) and the host is unreachable." width="1000" height="400" data-path="images/claude-tag/diagrams/proxy-decision-dark.svg" /> Because requests to any other host are blocked, data can only leave the sandbox to hosts an allow layer covers. An admin sets the Allowed websites list on each connection and the Domains tab on each bundle. An admin sets the environment's network access level, which defaults to Trusted access, from the **Cloud environments** page in [admin settings](https://claude.ai/admin-settings). See [Set allowed websites](/docs/claude-tag/admins/add-connections#set-allowed-websites) and [Allow a host without a credential](/docs/claude-tag/admins/add-connections#allow-a-host-without-a-credential). Organizations can opt in to allow-all egress, where a `*` entry on a bundle's Domains tab admits requests to any host on the ports that entry lists, still without credentials. Private and internal network addresses and cloud metadata endpoints remain blocked. Allow-all egress is off by default and enabled per organization by Anthropic; see [Allow all hosts](/docs/claude-tag/admins/add-connections#allow-all-hosts). ### Service accounts In channels, Claude acts under service credentials of its own, not under the account of the person who tagged it. The Slack surface is the Claude app, code work goes through the Claude GitHub App, and every other connected tool uses a service account an Owner provisions in an Access bundle. See [How agent identity works](/docs/claude-tag/concepts/agent-identity) for the full model. A connection belongs to that agent identity and is shared by everyone the bundle's scope covers. Anyone in a channel under that scope can ask Claude to act with the credential, so whatever the connected account can read or write is available to every member of those channels. Connect a dedicated identity you control for each service, such as a `[email protected]` seat or a native service account, rather than a personal login. A dedicated account keeps the agent's actions separately auditable in each tool's logs and lets you revoke its access without affecting a person; see [Create a dedicated account per service](/docs/claude-tag/admins/add-connections#create-a-dedicated-account-per-service). DMs with `@Claude` run on the user's own claude.ai account instead, with that user's personal connectors, and work there is attributed to them, except pull requests, which the Claude GitHub App authors from DMs as well. Personal connectors apply only in DMs, never in channels. Owners can disable DMs organization-wide; see [Allow or disable direct messages](/docs/claude-tag/admins/restrict-access#allow-or-disable-direct-messages). ### Isolate credentials between channels A channel session can use only the [Access bundles](/docs/claude-tag/admins/add-connections) attached in one of three places: * **The channel itself.** A bundle you attach here applies in that channel only. * **The channel's workspace.** A bundle you attach here applies in every channel of that workspace. * **[Default Slack access](/docs/claude-tag/admins/attach-to-scope#how-scopes-inherit).** The organization-wide root; a bundle you attach here applies in every channel of every paired workspace. A bundle attached anywhere else in your organization is invisible to the session, and no request from the session's sandbox can carry a credential from a bundle outside those three scopes. For example, if you attach a bundle holding finance credentials to one private channel, sessions in every other channel run as if that credential doesn't exist. If you attach the same bundle to a workspace or to Default Slack access instead, every channel beneath it gets that access, so isolation comes from where you attach the bundle, not from the bundle itself. Confine a credential to one channel in three steps: 1. Attach its bundle to that channel and nowhere broader. 2. Keep the channel private. A bundle on a public channel [grants its access to anyone who joins](/docs/claude-tag/admins/attach-to-scope#attach-to-a-channel). 3. Check the channel's **Access summary** on the [Slack tab in admin settings](/docs/claude-tag/admins/attach-to-scope). It shows the access the channel actually gets, including what it inherits from the workspace and Default Slack access. Claude [doesn't operate in externally shared channels](/docs/claude-tag/admins/restrict-access#externally-shared-channels), so a channel shared with another company never has a session to isolate. Isolating a credential doesn't isolate what Claude knows. What it learns in a public channel becomes [workspace memory](/docs/claude-tag/users/memory) that sessions in the workspace's other channels can read, and it can [search public channels by keyword](/docs/claude-tag/admins/restrict-access#controls-that-aren%E2%80%99t-available) without being added to them, the same way any workspace member can. ## Artifact visibility A session can publish an artifact, a web page hosted on claude.ai with the link posted in the thread, and the page stays available after the sandbox is released. Anyone with access to the source Slack channel can open it, which in a public channel covers everyone in the workspace. Someone who opens the link without that access sees a request-access prompt rather than the page. There is no share setting for anyone to change, and updates go through Claude in the thread. Artifacts you publish from your own Claude Code sessions work differently: they belong to you, and you control who can open them, with sharing options that depend on your plan and organization settings. See the [Claude Code artifacts documentation](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/artifacts). ## Member access By default, anyone in a connected Slack workspace can invoke Claude in channels, with or without a Claude account. An Owner can turn on a restriction toggle to narrow that: on Team plans it limits Claude to people with a Claude account in your organization, and on Enterprise plans it limits Claude to members whose role grants the **Claude Tag in Slack** capability. See [Restrict who can use Claude](/docs/claude-tag/admins/restrict-access#members). The toggle governs DMs as well as channels. ## Related resources * [How agent identity works](/docs/claude-tag/concepts/agent-identity): the identity model in full, including DM attribution * [Restrict where Claude Tag operates](/docs/claude-tag/admins/restrict-access): the controls that exist and the ones that don't * [Audit Claude Tag activity](/docs/claude-tag/admins/audit): the trails for tracing what it did