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Sweep 22 Oct 2026 · 04:32Z Build v2.1.308 527 read Stable v2.1.308 Latest v2.1.308 Next v2.1.308 Feeds RSS JSON llms.txt llms-full.txt Unofficial
One change · claude-code

Configure the sandboxed Bash tool changedsandboxing

Nearest release: v2.1.257, published 2 hours after this site recorded the change. Shown because the two are within 24 hours of each other. Nothing here says the release caused the edit.

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306306* **Project or local settings**: Claude Code applies none of their `credentials` entries. Requires Claude Code v2.1.246 or later.
307307* **User settings**: Claude Code still applies the `deny` entries in `~/.claude/settings.json` and keeps its [file `mask` entries](#mask-credential-files) as restrictions, but drops its [environment variable `mask` entries](#mask-environment-variables).
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309There is no built-in credential deny list, so only the files and variables you list are restricted. The setting affects sandboxed Bash commands only. To strip Anthropic and cloud provider credentials from all subprocesses regardless of sandboxing, set [`CLAUDE_CODE_SUBPROCESS_ENV_SCRUB`](/docs/en/env-vars).
309There is no built-in credential deny list, so only the files and variables you list are restricted.
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311`sandbox.credentials` affects sandboxed Bash commands only. To strip credentials from all subprocesses regardless of sandboxing, set [`CLAUDE_CODE_SUBPROCESS_ENV_SCRUB`](/docs/en/env-vars).
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311313### Mask credentials
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313315Masking goes further than a `deny` entry under [Protect credentials](#protect-credentials). Instead of blocking a credential, Claude Code shows sandboxed commands a placeholder, the sentinel, and the [sandbox proxy](#network-isolation) swaps in the real value on outbound requests to hosts you allow. For files, the substitution is Linux and WSL2 behavior; [macOS blocks the file instead](#mask-credential-files).
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679681* **Built-in file tools**: Read, Edit, and Write use the permission system directly rather than running through the sandbox. See [permissions](/docs/en/permissions).
680682* **Computer use**: when Claude opens apps and controls your screen, it runs on your actual desktop rather than in an isolated environment. Per-app permission prompts gate each application. See [computer use in the CLI](/docs/en/computer-use) or [computer use in Desktop](/docs/en/desktop#let-claude-use-your-computer).
681* **Environment variables**: sandboxed Bash commands inherit the parent process environment by default, including any credentials set there. Use [`sandbox.credentials`](#protect-credentials) to unset or mask specific variables for sandboxed commands, or set [`CLAUDE_CODE_SUBPROCESS_ENV_SCRUB`](/docs/en/env-vars) to strip Anthropic and cloud provider credentials from all subprocesses.
683* **Environment variables**: sandboxed Bash commands inherit the parent process environment by default, including any credentials set there. Use [`sandbox.credentials`](#protect-credentials) to unset or mask specific variables for sandboxed commands, or set [`CLAUDE_CODE_SUBPROCESS_ENV_SCRUB`](/docs/en/env-vars) to strip credentials from all subprocesses.
682684* **Subagents**: [subagents](/docs/en/sub-agents) run in the same process as the parent session and use the same sandbox configuration. Bash commands inside a subagent are sandboxed when sandboxing is enabled in the parent session.
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