Security and data handling changedgovernment/security/security-and-data-handling
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3939On macOS, those shell commands run inside an operating-system-level sandbox that the application builds from your organization's **Allowed network hosts** and **Allowed workspace folders** settings on the [Config](/docs/government/config/settings#allowed-network-hosts) page. The sandbox is in place whenever either setting restricts access, which the default configuration does. A user can exempt specific commands from this sandbox in a Claude Code settings file, and an exempted command runs outside the sandbox under the permission mode the user selects for the session.
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41The macOS sandbox also blocks connections to local Unix sockets. A command that talks to a local agent through a socket, such as git signing a commit with a key held in an SSH agent or a hardware-backed key manager, cannot reach that agent from inside the sandbox. A user who needs such a command to work can list the agent's socket path under `sandbox.network.allowUnixSockets` in their Claude Code settings file, which keeps the command inside the sandbox. Every sandboxed command in that user's Code sessions can then ask the agent to sign or authenticate, so this is appropriate only for an agent that asks the user to approve each use, for example with Touch ID, and not for an agent that signs without prompting. See [Sandbox settings](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/settings#sandbox-settings) in the Claude Code documentation.
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43Exempting git commands such as `git commit` with `sandbox.excludedCommands` is not a safe way around the socket restriction. A sandboxed command can still change files that git runs during a commit, such as hook scripts kept in the working tree, and an exempted `git commit` would then run that code outside the sandbox. Git also cannot reach remotes over SSH from inside the sandbox, so a user who needs to push can use an HTTPS remote whose host is on the **Allowed network hosts** list, or push from a terminal outside the Code session.
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4145On Windows, there is no operating-system-level sandbox for Code sessions. Shell commands run directly on the device under the permission mode the user selects for the session and under your agency's own endpoint and network controls. The **Allowed network hosts** and **Allowed workspace folders** settings do not confine what those commands can reach or change.
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4347On both operating systems, the application starts a Code session only in a folder that **Allowed workspace folders** permits when that setting is configured. Administrators can also require a prompt on every shell command, in every permission mode, with the **Require approval for each command** sub-setting on the **Shell commands** card of the [Config](/docs/government/config/settings#tool-and-connector-cards) page.
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