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Sweep 22 Oct 2026 · 21:04Z Build v2.1.309 528 read Stable v2.1.308 Latest v2.1.309 Next v2.1.309 Feeds RSS JSON llms.txt llms-full.txt Unofficial
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Securely deploying AI agents changedagent-sdk/secure-deployment

Nearest release: v2.1.291, published under an hour after upstream edited the page. Shown because the two are within 24 hours of each other. Nothing here says the release caused the edit.

Upstream edited this page at 6 Oct 2026 03:21 UTC, give or take a minute or two: the time comes from Anthropic’s own sitemap rather than from a commit. This site recorded the change at 20 Oct 2026 18:37 UTC.

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5959 
6060Different isolation technologies offer different tradeoffs between security strength, performance, and operational complexity.
6161 
62<Info>
63 In all of these configurations, Claude Code (or your Agent SDK application) runs inside the isolation boundary (the sandbox, container, or VM). The security controls described below restrict what the agent can access from within that boundary.
64</Info>
62> [!NOTE]
63>
64> In all of these configurations, Claude Code (or your Agent SDK application) runs inside the isolation boundary (the sandbox, container, or VM). The security controls described below restrict what the agent can access from within that boundary.
6565 
6666| Technology | Isolation strength | Performance overhead | Complexity |
6767| - | - | - | - |
from line 277
277277 
278278Note that not all programs respect `HTTP_PROXY`/`HTTPS_PROXY`. Most tools (curl, pip, npm, git) do, but some may bypass these variables and connect directly. For example, Node.js `fetch()` ignores these variables by default; in Node 24+ you can set `NODE_USE_ENV_PROXY=1` to enable support. To cover tools that ignore these variables, you can use [proxychains](https://github.com/haad/proxychains) to intercept network calls, or configure iptables to redirect outbound traffic to a transparent proxy.
279279 
280<Info>
281 A **transparent proxy** intercepts traffic at the network level, so the client doesn't need to be configured to use it. Regular proxies require clients to explicitly connect and speak HTTP CONNECT or SOCKS. Transparent proxies (like Squid or mitmproxy in transparent mode) can handle raw redirected TCP connections.
282</Info>
280> [!NOTE]
281>
282> A **transparent proxy** intercepts traffic at the network level, so the client doesn't need to be configured to use it. Regular proxies require clients to explicitly connect and speak HTTP CONNECT or SOCKS. Transparent proxies (like Squid or mitmproxy in transparent mode) can handle raw redirected TCP connections.
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284284Both approaches still require the TLS-terminating proxy and trusted CA certificate. They just ensure traffic actually reaches the proxy.
285285 
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295295docker run -v /path/to/code:/workspace:ro agent-image
296296```
297297 
298<Warning>
299 Even read-only access to a code directory can expose credentials. Common files to exclude or sanitize before mounting:
300 
301 | File | Risk |
302 | - | - |
303 | `.env`, `.env.local` | API keys, database passwords, secrets |
304 | `~/.git-credentials` | Git passwords/tokens in plaintext |
305 | `~/.aws/credentials` | AWS access keys |
306 | `~/.config/gcloud/application_default_credentials.json` | Google Cloud ADC tokens |
307 | `~/.azure/` | Azure CLI credentials |
308 | `~/.docker/config.json` | Docker registry auth tokens |
309 | `~/.kube/config` | Kubernetes cluster credentials |
310 | `.npmrc`, `.pypirc` | Package registry tokens |
311 | `*-service-account.json` | GCP service account keys |
312 | `*.pem`, `*.key` | Private keys |
313 
314 Consider copying only the source files needed, or using `.dockerignore`-style filtering.
315</Warning>
298> [!WARNING]
299>
300> Even read-only access to a code directory can expose credentials. Common files to exclude or sanitize before mounting:
301>
302> | File | Risk |
303> | - | - |
304> | `.env`, `.env.local` | API keys, database passwords, secrets |
305> | `~/.git-credentials` | Git passwords/tokens in plaintext |
306> | `~/.aws/credentials` | AWS access keys |
307> | `~/.config/gcloud/application_default_credentials.json` | Google Cloud ADC tokens |
308> | `~/.azure/` | Azure CLI credentials |
309> | `~/.docker/config.json` | Docker registry auth tokens |
310> | `~/.kube/config` | Kubernetes cluster credentials |
311> | `.npmrc`, `.pypirc` | Package registry tokens |
312> | `*-service-account.json` | GCP service account keys |
313> | `*.pem`, `*.key` | Private keys |
314>
315> Consider copying only the source files needed, or using `.dockerignore`-style filtering.
316316 
317317### Writable locations
318318 
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