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Sweep 22 Oct 2026 · 04:32Z Build v2.1.308 527 read Stable v2.1.308 Latest v2.1.308 Next v2.1.308 Feeds RSS JSON llms.txt llms-full.txt Unofficial
HomeDocsClaude Code CLI 19 Oct 2026
One change · claude-code

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Nearest release: v2.1.304, published an hour after upstream edited the page. Shown because the two are within 24 hours of each other. Nothing here says the release caused the edit.

Upstream edited this page at 19 Oct 2026 18:23 UTC, give or take a minute or two: the time comes from Anthropic’s own sitemap rather than from a commit. This site recorded the change at 19 Oct 2026 18:37 UTC.

Upstream edited
Recorded here
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From line 459 where the diff opens
First seen 14 Aug 2026 this site's first read of the page
Recorded edits91to this page, all time

The whole hunk

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459459* Modifying shared infrastructure
460460* Irreversibly destroying files that existed before the session
461461* Force push
462* Committing or pushing a change that would send secrets or sensitive data outside the repository when it runs, or widen what a deploy exposes. This covers a CI workflow or deploy configuration that passes a secret to a destination that doesn't already receive it, a script or setup step that reads a secret store and sends the data out, and a config change that widens what a deploy publishes, such as a registry, visibility, artifact, or sourcemap setting. The check applies on any branch, applies even when the repository is public, and fires when the change is committed or pushed, whether or not that commit or push triggers the pipeline; clearing it requires naming the execution effect, not only the commit or push. Before v2.1.211, this check was scoped to the default branch instead: a push there was blocked when it carried sensitive content, changes concealed or misdescribed relative to what you asked for, content ported in from outside the repository, or routed around a review you asked for
462* Committing or pushing a change that would send secrets or sensitive data outside the repository when it runs, or widen what a deploy exposes. This covers a CI workflow or deploy configuration that passes a secret to a destination that doesn't already receive it, a script or setup step that reads a secret store and sends the data out, and a config change that widens what a deploy publishes, such as a registry, visibility, artifact, or sourcemap setting. The check applies on any branch, applies even when the repository is public, and fires when the change is committed or pushed, whether or not that commit or push triggers the pipeline; clearing it requires naming the execution effect, not only the commit or push
463463* `git reset --hard`, `git checkout -- .`, `git restore .`, `git clean -fd`, `git stash drop`, or `git stash clear`, which the classifier presumes would discard uncommitted changes
464464* `git commit --amend` when the commit at HEAD was not created in this session
465465* From v2.1.198, `git commit --amend` when the commit at HEAD has already been pushed. A message-only reword is not blocked: `--amend -m` with nothing newly staged, on a commit that Claude created during this session
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