Code in Claude Desktop on 3P changedthird-party/claude-desktop/code
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Upstream edited this page at 13 Oct 2026 19:06 UTC, give or take a minute or two: the time comes from Anthropic’s own sitemap rather than from a commit. This site recorded the change at 13 Oct 2026 19:07 UTC.
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3939| Claude Desktop on 3P key | Claude Code policy it produces |
4040| - | - |
41| `coworkEgressAllowedHosts` | A network sandbox restricted to your hosts plus the inference and telemetry endpoints, `WebFetch` permission rules for the same hosts, and `allowManagedDomainsOnly`. |
41| `coworkEgressAllowedHosts` | A network sandbox restricted to your hosts, `allowManagedDomainsOnly`, and `WebFetch` allow rules for the same hosts, which [don't block other hosts](/docs/third-party/claude-desktop/web-tools#how-the-egress-allowlist-applies-in-code-sessions). Claude Code's own inference and telemetry connections run outside the sandbox. A shell command or [HTTP hook](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/hooks#http-hook-fields) that calls your inference provider, `api.anthropic.com`, or your OTLP collector needs that host in the list. |
4242| `allowedWorkspaceFolders` | A filesystem sandbox for shell commands, which can then create or change files only inside your allowed roots and the session's temporary locations. The sandbox does not restrict which files those commands read unless you also set `blockReadsOutsideWorkingDirectories`. The roots are also passed as `additionalDirectories` at launch, which is always applied independent of managed-settings precedence, and the app keeps Claude's file tools inside the roots. The app also refuses to start a Code session outside an allowed root. |
4343| `blockReadsOutsideWorkingDirectories` | Claude Code's `permissions.blockReadsOutsideWorkingDirectories` for Code sessions. Claude's file tools refuse to read outside the working directories (the session's folder plus your allowed roots, if any) in every permission mode. Where the sandbox from `allowedWorkspaceFolders` or `coworkEgressAllowedHosts` is running, it also hides the user's home directory and similar locations, such as other users' home folders and mounted volumes, from shell commands, so a sandboxed command that reads there fails without a prompt. Without a running sandbox, a shell command that reads outside the working directories, or that Claude Code cannot analyze, asks the user for approval first, even in bypass permissions mode. The key requires Claude Desktop 1.46388.1 or later. The block takes effect only in sessions that run Claude Code v2.1.257 or later; if the app cannot install its current Claude Code engine and a session runs one older than v2.1.257 that is still on the device, that session runs without the block and the app logs a warning. |
4444| `managedMcpServers` | `strictPluginOnlyCustomization` set to `["mcp"]`, so the Code session does not load MCP servers that users define on Claude Code's side (`~/.claude.json`, a project's `.mcp.json`, or `claude mcp add`); your managed servers, which the app connects and supplies to the session itself, and MCP servers bundled in plugins still load. When [`isLocalDevMcpEnabled`](/docs/third-party/claude-desktop/configuration#islocaldevmcpenabled) is `false`, the app also sets an `allowedMcpServers` list that admits only remote servers, with `allowManagedMcpServersOnly`, so local (stdio) servers bundled in plugins from marketplaces or that users install themselves are refused, while those plugins' remote servers still connect. Per-tool `toolPolicy` values on each server are emitted as `permissions.deny` (for `blocked`) or `permissions.ask` (for `ask`) rules against the corresponding `mcp__<server>__<tool>` names. |
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4747| `builtinToolPolicy`, argument-scoped rules such as `Bash(curl *)` | A `permissions.ask` rule for each rule set to `"ask"`. |
4848
4949The network and filesystem sandboxes apply on macOS, and on Linux devices and [SSH hosts](/docs/third-party/claude-desktop/ssh-remote-sessions#managed-configuration-on-the-remote-host) with Claude Code's [sandbox dependencies](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/sandboxing) installed. Claude Code doesn't sandbox shell commands on Windows devices, and on a Linux device or SSH host without the dependencies commands run unsandboxed. In those cases, and when `coworkEgressAllowedHosts` contains `*` and `allowedWorkspaceFolders` is unset, `blockReadsOutsideWorkingDirectories` still confines Claude's file tools but can only ask the user to approve shell commands that read outside the working directories or that Claude Code can't verify. For what a remote session shows, see [Sandbox status on the remote host](/docs/third-party/claude-desktop/ssh-remote-sessions#sandbox-status-on-the-remote-host).
50
51<Warning>
52 Shell commands that run unsandboxed can reach hosts outside `coworkEgressAllowedHosts` and change files outside `allowedWorkspaceFolders`. Where the sandbox runs, a command that matches [`sandbox.excludedCommands`](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/sandboxing#run-commands-outside-the-sandbox-with-excludedcommands) in the user's own Claude Code settings also runs outside it, after Claude Code's regular permission flow. To keep Code off devices where the sandbox can't run, [turn off Code](#disabling-code) in the configuration you deploy to them. For SSH hosts, see [Sandbox status on the remote host](/docs/third-party/claude-desktop/ssh-remote-sessions#sandbox-status-on-the-remote-host).
53</Warning>
5054
5155Under `blockReadsOutsideWorkingDirectories`, sandboxed shell commands can still read system locations such as `/usr`, the session's plugin and attachment folders (which become read-only), and the user's git configuration files (`~/.gitconfig` and the `config`, `ignore`, and `attributes` files under `~/.config/git`), which can themselves hold credentials such as tokens in remote URLs. Other files under the home folder outside the working directories are hidden from them, including `~/.ssh`, stored git credentials, included git configuration files, signing keys, and the target of a symlinked git configuration file, so git operations that need those files fail in the session until the user re-opens the paths. In a local session Claude also cannot read a file attached or `@`-mentioned from outside the working directories, so users should move such files into the session's folder or an allowed folder first.
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