Claude Code settings changedsettings
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256256| `disableAgentView` | Set to `true` to turn off [background agents and agent view](/docs/en/agent-view): `claude agents`, `--bg`, `/background`, and the on-demand supervisor. Typically set in [managed settings](/docs/en/permissions#managed-settings). Equivalent to setting `CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_AGENT_VIEW` to `1` | `true` |
257257| `disableAllHooks` | Disable all [hooks](/docs/en/hooks#disable-or-remove-hooks), any custom [status line](/docs/en/statusline), and any custom [file suggestion](#file-suggestion-settings) command | `true` |
258258| `disableArtifact` | Set to `true` to disable the [Artifact](/docs/en/artifacts) tool, which publishes session output as a private web page on claude.ai. Equivalent to setting `CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_ARTIFACT` to `1` | `true` |
259| `disableAutoMode` | Set to `"disable"` to prevent [auto mode](/docs/en/permission-modes#eliminate-prompts-with-auto-mode) from being activated. Removes `auto` from the `Shift+Tab` cycle and rejects `--permission-mode auto` at startup. Also accepted under `permissions` as `permissions.disableAutoMode`. Most useful in [managed settings](/docs/en/permissions#managed-settings) where users cannot override it | `"disable"` |
259| `disableAutoMode` | Set to `"disable"` to prevent [auto mode](/docs/en/permission-modes#eliminate-prompts-with-auto-mode) from being activated. Removes `auto` from the `Shift+Tab` cycle, and any session that would otherwise [start in auto mode](/docs/en/permission-modes#which-mode-a-session-starts-in), whether from `--permission-mode auto`, a settings file, or the built-in default, starts in `default` instead. Also accepted under `permissions` as `permissions.disableAutoMode`. Most useful in [managed settings](/docs/en/permissions#managed-settings) where users cannot override it | `"disable"` |
260260| `disableBrowserExternalNavigation` | (Managed settings only) Set to `true` to turn off external browsing in the desktop app's [Browser pane](/docs/en/desktop#browse-external-sites). Neither users nor Claude can navigate to external sites, and localhost dev server previews are unaffected. The value must be the JSON boolean `true`; the string `"true"` is ignored | `true` |
261261| `disableBundledSkills` | Set to `true` to disable the [skills](/docs/en/skills) and workflows included with Claude Code: bundled skills and workflows are removed entirely, while built-in commands like `/init` stay typable but are hidden from the model. `/doctor` stays typable like the built-in commands; hide it with [`DISABLE_DOCTOR_COMMAND`](/docs/en/env-vars) instead. Skills from plugins, `.claude/skills/`, and `.claude/commands/` are unaffected. Equivalent to setting `CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_BUNDLED_SKILLS` to `1` | `true` |
262262| `disableClaudeAiConnectors` | Disable [claude.ai MCP connectors](/docs/en/mcp#use-mcp-servers-from-claude-ai) so they are not auto-fetched or connected. Set in any settings scope. `true` in any source takes precedence, so a checked-in project `.claude/settings.json` can opt a repo out of cloud connectors, but a project-level `false` cannot override a user- or policy-level `true`. Servers passed explicitly via `--mcp-config` are unaffected. To deny individual connectors instead of all of them, use [`deniedMcpServers`](/docs/en/managed-mcp). Requires Claude Code v2.1.182 or later | `true` |
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377377
378378### Permission settings
379379
380| Keys | Description | Example |
381| :---------------------------------- | :---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :--------------------------------------------------------------------- |
382| `allow` | Array of permission rules to allow tool use. Tool-name globs are supported only in the tool position after a literal `mcp__<server>__` prefix, such as `mcp__github__get_*`; the server segment must be glob-free. See [Permission rule syntax](#permission-rule-syntax) below for pattern matching details | `[ "Bash(git diff *)" ]` |
383| `ask` | Array of permission rules to ask for confirmation upon tool use. See [Permission rule syntax](#permission-rule-syntax) below | `[ "Bash(git push *)" ]` |
384| `deny` | Array of permission rules to deny tool use. Use this to exclude sensitive files from Claude Code access. Tool names accept glob patterns: `"*"` denies every tool and `"mcp__*"` denies every MCP tool. Deny rules can't remove [`EndConversation`](/docs/en/tools-reference#endconversation-tool-behavior) while any other tool remains. See [Permission rule syntax](#permission-rule-syntax) and [Bash permission limitations](/docs/en/permissions#tool-specific-permission-rules) | `[ "WebFetch", "Bash(curl *)", "Read(./.env)", "Read(./secrets/**)" ]` |
385| `additionalDirectories` | Additional [working directories](/docs/en/permissions#working-directories) for file access. Most `.claude/` configuration is [not discovered](/docs/en/permissions#additional-directories-grant-file-access-not-configuration) from these directories | `[ "../docs/" ]` |
386| `defaultMode` | Default [permission mode](/docs/en/permission-modes) for new sessions. In sessions the [VS Code extension](/docs/en/vs-code) starts, the extension resolves the starting mode instead. Valid values: `default`, `acceptEdits`, `plan`, `auto`, `dontAsk`, `bypassPermissions`, and `manual` as an alias for `default`, the mode labeled Manual in the CLI, the VS Code and JetBrains extensions, and the desktop app. The `manual` alias requires Claude Code v2.1.200 or later. `auto` is ignored when set in project or local settings, so a repository can't grant itself auto mode; set it in `~/.claude/settings.json` instead. Before v2.1.142, project settings could set `auto`. The `--permission-mode` CLI flag overrides this setting for a single session | `"acceptEdits"` |
387| `disableAutoMode` | Set to `"disable"` to prevent [auto mode](/docs/en/permission-modes#eliminate-prompts-with-auto-mode) from being activated. Equivalent to the top-level [`disableAutoMode`](#available-settings) setting, which describes the full effect. Most useful in [managed settings](/docs/en/permissions#managed-settings) where users cannot override it | `"disable"` |
388| `disableBypassPermissionsMode` | Set to `"disable"` to prevent `bypassPermissions` mode from being activated. This disables the `--dangerously-skip-permissions` command-line flag, and Claude Code ignores an [agent definition's](/docs/en/sub-agents#permission-modes) `permissionMode: bypassPermissions`, so the subagent runs with the parent session's mode. Before v2.1.223, Claude Code applied the frontmatter mode even with bypass disabled. Typically placed in [managed settings](/docs/en/permissions#managed-settings) to enforce organizational policy, but works from any scope | `"disable"` |
389| `skipDangerousModePermissionPrompt` | Skip the confirmation prompt shown before entering bypass permissions mode via `--dangerously-skip-permissions` or `defaultMode: "bypassPermissions"`. Ignored when set in project settings (`.claude/settings.json`) to prevent untrusted repositories from auto-bypassing the prompt | `true` |
380| Keys | Description | Example |
381| :---------------------------------- | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------- |
382| `allow` | Array of permission rules to allow tool use. Tool-name globs are supported only in the tool position after a literal `mcp__<server>__` prefix, such as `mcp__github__get_*`; the server segment must be glob-free. See [Permission rule syntax](#permission-rule-syntax) below for pattern matching details | `[ "Bash(git diff *)" ]` |
383| `ask` | Array of permission rules to ask for confirmation upon tool use. See [Permission rule syntax](#permission-rule-syntax) below | `[ "Bash(git push *)" ]` |
384| `deny` | Array of permission rules to deny tool use. Use this to exclude sensitive files from Claude Code access. Tool names accept glob patterns: `"*"` denies every tool and `"mcp__*"` denies every MCP tool. Deny rules can't remove [`EndConversation`](/docs/en/tools-reference#endconversation-tool-behavior) while any other tool remains. See [Permission rule syntax](#permission-rule-syntax) and [Bash permission limitations](/docs/en/permissions#tool-specific-permission-rules) | `[ "WebFetch", "Bash(curl *)", "Read(./.env)", "Read(./secrets/**)" ]` |
385| `additionalDirectories` | Additional [working directories](/docs/en/permissions#working-directories) for file access. Most `.claude/` configuration is [not discovered](/docs/en/permissions#additional-directories-grant-file-access-not-configuration) from these directories | `[ "../docs/" ]` |
386| `defaultMode` | [Permission mode](/docs/en/permission-modes) that new sessions start in. When unset, sessions start in the [built-in default](/docs/en/permission-modes#which-mode-a-session-starts-in) for your plan and surface. For conversations the VS Code extension starts, see [what the extension reads](/docs/en/permission-modes#switch-permission-modes). Valid values: `default`, `acceptEdits`, `plan`, `auto`, `dontAsk`, `bypassPermissions`, and `manual` as an alias for `default`, the mode labeled Manual in the CLI, the VS Code and JetBrains extensions, and the desktop app. The `manual` alias requires Claude Code v2.1.200 or later. `auto` doesn't take effect from project or local settings; set it in `~/.claude/settings.json` instead. Before v2.1.142, project settings could set `auto`. The `--permission-mode` CLI flag overrides this setting for a single session | `"acceptEdits"` |
387| `disableAutoMode` | Set to `"disable"` to prevent [auto mode](/docs/en/permission-modes#eliminate-prompts-with-auto-mode) from being activated. Equivalent to the top-level [`disableAutoMode`](#available-settings) setting, which describes the full effect. Most useful in [managed settings](/docs/en/permissions#managed-settings) where users cannot override it | `"disable"` |
388| `disableBypassPermissionsMode` | Set to `"disable"` to prevent `bypassPermissions` mode from being activated. This disables the `--dangerously-skip-permissions` command-line flag, and Claude Code ignores an [agent definition's](/docs/en/sub-agents#permission-modes) `permissionMode: bypassPermissions`, so the subagent runs with the parent session's mode. Before v2.1.223, Claude Code applied the frontmatter mode even with bypass disabled. Typically placed in [managed settings](/docs/en/permissions#managed-settings) to enforce organizational policy, but works from any scope | `"disable"` |
389| `skipDangerousModePermissionPrompt` | Skip the confirmation prompt shown before entering bypass permissions mode via `--dangerously-skip-permissions` or `defaultMode: "bypassPermissions"`. Ignored when set in project settings (`.claude/settings.json`) to prevent untrusted repositories from auto-bypassing the prompt | `true` |
390390
391391### Permission rule syntax
392392
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436436| `credentials.allowPlaintextInject` | Allow `mask` substitution on plain HTTP requests as well as TLS-terminated HTTPS. On plain HTTP the upstream identity is unverified and the credential travels in cleartext, so leave this off outside trusted test networks. Only honored from user, managed, or CLI `--settings` settings, not from `.claude/settings.json` or `.claude/settings.local.json`. Default: false. Requires Claude Code v2.1.199 or later. | `true` |
437437| `credentials.awsPairs` | Groups of masked environment variables that form one AWS credential for [SigV4 re-signing](/docs/en/sandboxing#re-sign-aws-requests), for non-standard variable names; Claude Code links the conventional `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID`, `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`, and `AWS_SESSION_TOKEN` trio automatically when those variables are masked whole-value. Each entry names the `credentials.envVars` entry holding each part in `accessKeyIdVar`, `secretAccessKeyVar`, and optionally `sessionTokenVar`. Each named variable must be a whole-value `mask` entry, without `extract` or `decode`, and can fill only one slot across all pairs. Only honored from user, managed, or CLI `--settings` settings. Requires Claude Code v2.1.224 or later. | `[{ "accessKeyIdVar": "MY_KEY_ID", "secretAccessKeyVar": "MY_SECRET_KEY" }]` |
438438| `credentials.sigv4` | Policies for AWS request forms the sandbox proxy [can't re-sign](/docs/en/sandboxing#re-sign-aws-requests): `streaming` for aws-chunked streaming uploads, `presigned` for presigned URLs, and `sigv4a` for SigV4A asymmetric signatures. Each accepts `deny`, the default, which fails the request at the proxy, or `passthrough`, which forwards the request with its signature computed from the masked placeholder, so AWS rejects it. Applies only to requests signed with a masked pair's placeholder access key ID. Only honored from user, managed, or CLI `--settings` settings. Requires Claude Code v2.1.224 or later. | `{ "streaming": "passthrough" }` |
439| `network.allowUnixSockets` | (macOS only) Unix socket paths accessible in sandbox. Ignored on Linux and WSL2, where the seccomp filter cannot inspect socket paths; use `allowAllUnixSockets` instead. | `["~/.ssh/agent-socket"]` |
440| `network.allowAllUnixSockets` | Allow all Unix socket connections in sandbox. On Linux and WSL2, when the optional [seccomp filter](/docs/en/sandboxing#set-up-linux-and-wsl2) is installed, this is the only way to permit Unix sockets, since it skips the filter that otherwise blocks `socket(AF_UNIX, ...)` calls; without the filter, the sandbox doesn't block Unix-socket calls. On WSL2, `true` also reopens the interop socket that launches Windows binaries. Default: false | `true` |
441| `network.allowLocalBinding` | Allow binding to localhost ports (macOS only). Default:
439| `network.allowUnixSockets` | (macOS only) Unix socket paths accessible in sandbox. Ignored on Linux and WSL2, where the seccomp filter cannot inspect socket paths; use `allowAllUnixSockets` instead. | `["~/.ssh/agent-socket"]`
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