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One read of Claude Code CLIclaude-code-20261111T170702Z

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permission-modes Changed · +5 / -3 lines

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480480* Opening a pull request against a different repository or organization, forking with `gh repo fork`, or pushing to a third-party repository, unless you named that external target
481481* Content from a sensitive local store, or from a file whose name, path, or type marks it as sensitive, entering a commit, a push, PR or issue text, a gist or paste, or a package publish, unless you named both the source and the destination. Session transcripts and conversation logs, credential and configuration dot-folders such as SSH keys, cloud credentials, browser profiles, and shell history, and user-data exports all count, and the repository being private doesn't clear it
482482* Writing to Claude Code session transcripts, the `.jsonl` history files under `~/.claude/projects/` or your configured config directory, whether directly or through a shell command. The rule also covers the metadata lines Claude Code appends to each transcript entry for its own checks. Reading a transcript isn't blocked
483* A recursive forced delete such as `rm -rf "$VAR"` or `Remove-Item -Recurse -Force $dir` whose target is a shell variable that isn't assigned anywhere in the conversation the classifier sees, or a glob rooted at such a variable. The value came only from earlier command output, which the classifier never receives, so the classifier can't verify the deletion target against the other deletion rules. The block clears when you name the exact path being deleted, or when Claude re-runs the delete with the resolved literal path written into the command. Deletes whose target the classifier can resolve aren't affected.
483* A recursive forced delete such as `rm -rf "$VAR"` or `Remove-Item -Recurse -Force $dir` whose target is a shell variable that isn't assigned in the conversation the classifier sees, or a glob rooted at such a variable. Without that assignment, the classifier can't tell what the command would delete.
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485 A glob directly under the variable, as in `rm -rf "$VAR"/*`, is a [critical path](#critical-paths) instead. `Remove-Item` targets that are a bare `*` or end in `/*` or `\*` never reach the classifier: Claude Code [denies them outright](#remove-item-in-powershell).
485 The block clears when you name the exact path being deleted, or when Claude re-runs the delete with the resolved literal path written into the command. Deletes whose target the classifier can resolve aren't affected.
486 
487 A glob directly under the variable, as in `rm -rf "$VAR"/*`, is a [critical path](#critical-paths) instead. For a `Remove-Item` target that is a bare `*` or ends in `/*` or `\*`, see [Remove-Item in PowerShell](#remove-item-in-powershell): Claude Code denies that command outright.
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487489Several of these categories depend on [environment](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/auto-mode-config.md#define-trusted-infrastructure) entries, such as sensitive remote targets and protected IaC scopes, that you can narrow to concrete names.
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glossary Changed · +2 / -2 lines

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5050 
5151### Auto mode
5252 
53A [permission mode](#permission-mode) where a separate classifier model reviews actions instead of you, so Claude Code runs most of them without asking you. Claude Code still asks you before actions your explicit ask rules match. The classifier blocks scope escalation, untrusted infrastructure, and [prompt injection](#prompt-injection). Tool results are stripped from what it sees, so hostile content in a file or web page can't manipulate it directly.
53A [permission mode](#permission-mode) where a separate classifier model reviews actions instead of you, so Claude Code runs most of them without asking you. Claude Code still asks you before actions your explicit ask rules match. The classifier blocks scope escalation, untrusted infrastructure, and [prompt injection](#prompt-injection).
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5555* **Claude Code v2.1.283 or later**: auto mode is the [built-in starting permission mode](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/permission-modes.md#which-mode-a-session-starts-in) for interactive terminal and VS Code sessions
5656* **Earlier versions**: auto mode is the built-in starting permission mode only on Pro, Max, Ultra, and Team plans
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257257 
258258### Prompt injection
259259 
260Hostile instructions embedded in a file, web page, or tool result that attempt to redirect Claude toward actions you never asked for. Claude Code's defenses include the permission system, command injection detection, and trust verification. [Auto mode](#auto-mode) adds a server-side probe that scans tool results for suspicious content and a classifier that reviews actions with tool results stripped, so injected text can't manipulate it directly.
260Hostile instructions embedded in a file, web page, or tool result that attempt to redirect Claude toward actions you didn't ask for. Claude Code's defenses include the permission system, command injection detection, and trust verification. In [auto mode](#auto-mode), a server-side probe scans tool results for suspicious content, and a classifier reviews actions.
261261 
262262Learn more: [Protect against prompt injection](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/security.md#protect-against-prompt-injection)
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hooks Changed · +1 / -1 lines

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23382338#### Annotate a result for the auto mode classifier
23392339 
2340Return `classifierContext` to send a short note about the tool call's result to the [auto mode](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/permission-modes.md#eliminate-prompts-with-auto-mode) classifier rather than to Claude. The classifier [never receives tool results themselves](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/permission-modes.md#how-the-classifier-evaluates-actions), so this field is the supported way to tell it something about what a call returned before it reviews later actions. The field requires Claude Code v2.1.236 or later.
2340Return `classifierContext` to send a short note about the tool call's result to the [auto mode](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/permission-modes.md#eliminate-prompts-with-auto-mode) classifier rather than to Claude. The note is for the classifier's review of later actions. The field requires Claude Code v2.1.236 or later.
23412341 
23422342The example below tells the classifier where a query's output came from:
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36823682Runs when an MCP server requests user input mid-task. By default, Claude Code shows an interactive dialog for the user to respond. Hooks can intercept this request and respond programmatically, skipping the dialog entirely.
36833683 
3684For a complete hook with its settings entry and script, see [Answer a form request from a script](#answer-a-form-reque
3684For a complete hook with its settings entry and script, see [Answer a form request from a script](#answer-a-form-request-from-a-script).
3685 
3686The matcher field matches against the MCP server name.
3687 
3688#### Elicitation input
3689 
3690In addition to the [common input fields](#common-input-fields), Elicitation hooks receive `mcp_server_nam

scheduled-tasks Changed · +1 / -1 lines

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225225 
226226## Disable session-scoped scheduled tasks
227227 
228Set `CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_CRON=1` in your environment to disable the scheduler entirely. The cron tools and `/loop` become unavailable, and any already-scheduled tasks stop firing. See [Environment variables](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/env-vars.md) for the full list of disable flags.
228Set `CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_CRON=1` in your environment to disable the scheduler entirely. `CronCreate` and `/loop` become unavailable, and any already-scheduled tasks stop firing. While the project's `.claude/scheduled_tasks.json` file holds tasks, `CronList` and `CronDelete` stay available, so you can still ask Claude to list or cancel them. See [Environment variables](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/env-vars.md) for the full list of disable flags.
229229 
230230## Limitations
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tools-reference Changed · +1 / -1 lines

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193193The time limit counts from the moment the command enters the background:
194194 
195195* A command that Claude starts in the background gets 30 minutes, or the `timeout` Claude passes with `run_in_background`, up to a maximum of 2 hours
196* A command that starts in the foreground and then moves to the background, for example at its timeout, gets 30 minutes from the move
196* A command that starts in the foreground and then moves to the background at its timeout gets 30 minutes from the move
197197 
198198In a run with the `-p` flag whose prompt you pass as text rather than with `--input-format stream-json`, both defaults are 10 minutes instead of 30, because the run [waits for background commands after its result](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/headless.md#background-tasks-at-exit).
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