{"version":"2.1.277","anchor":"gateway-egress-boundary-mode-outbound-traffic-can-defer-add","canonical_anchor":"gateway-egress-boundary-mode-outbound-traffic-can-defer-add","heading":"New gateway mode lets an outbound proxy be the sole network security boundary","tier":"use","area":"Gateway Proxy","scope":null,"heads_up":null,"url":"https:\/\/changelogs.core-directive.com\/v\/2.1.277\/e\/gateway-egress-boundary-mode-outbound-traffic-can-defer-add","release_url":"https:\/\/changelogs.core-directive.com\/v\/2.1.277","markdown":"### New gateway mode lets an outbound proxy be the sole network security boundary\n\nA new CLAUDE_GATEWAY_PROXY_IS_EGRESS_BOUNDARY setting lets Claude Code defer network safety checks to a forward proxy\n\n**What**\n\nA new environment variable, `CLAUDE_GATEWAY_PROXY_IS_EGRESS_BOUNDARY`, lets a gateway deployment tell Claude Code that all outbound network requests should be handed directly to an upstream HTTPS\/HTTP proxy (the one set via `HTTPS_PROXY`\/`HTTP_PROXY`), relying on that proxy's own allowlist. When this is active, Claude Code skips its own local DNS resolution and loopback\/SSRF (server-side request forgery) safety checks and just passes hostnames straight through to the proxy.\n\nThis mode refuses to turn on, and logs a warning explaining why, in three cases:\n\n- no `HTTPS_PROXY`\/`HTTP_PROXY` is configured\n\n- `CLAUDE_GATEWAY_ALLOW_LOOPBACK` is also set\n\n- `NO_PROXY`\/`no_proxy` is non-empty\n\n**Why**\n\nThis lets administrators who already enforce network restrictions at their proxy avoid redundant or conflicting checks from Claude Code itself, while the safeguards prevent the setting from silently weakening security in setups where no proxy is actually in place to do that job.\n\n- Area: Gateway Proxy\n- Names: `CLAUDE_GATEWAY_PROXY_IS_EGRESS_BOUNDARY`\n- Tier: Use it now\n- Useful: 5\/5\n- Signal: 3\/5"}