{"version":"2.1.271","anchor":"new-content-source-integrity-hashing-for-plugin-commands-and","canonical_anchor":"new-content-source-integrity-hashing-for-plugin-commands-and","heading":"New content-source integrity hashing for plugin commands and 'entry helper' sources","tier":"internal","area":"Plugins","scope":null,"heads_up":null,"url":"https:\/\/changelogs.core-directive.com\/v\/2.1.271\/e\/new-content-source-integrity-hashing-for-plugin-commands-and","release_url":"https:\/\/changelogs.core-directive.com\/v\/2.1.271","markdown":"### New content-source integrity hashing for plugin commands and 'entry helper' sources\n\nNew integrity-hashing system checks plugin commands and their sources before trusting them\n\n**What**\n\nClaude Code now computes a cryptographic fingerprint (a SHA-256 hash) over a plugin command's type, plugin ID, and command text, combined with either a catalog revision or an archive URL. A separate \"catalog revision\" value is derived from the plugin's git commit, a digest file in cloud storage, or a hash of its marketplace and package files.\n\nA new set of outcomes determines whether a plugin command is trusted before it runs:\n\n- `command_source_refused`\n\n- `command_source_declined`\n\n- `entry_helper_unconfirmed`\n\n- `entry_helper_declined`\n\n**Why**\n\nThis adds a verification step so plugin commands can be checked against a known-good source before Claude Code trusts them, reducing the risk of running a command whose origin can't be confirmed.\n\n- Area: Plugins\n- Tier: Under the hood\n- Useful: 2\/5\n- Signal: 2\/5"}