{"version":"2.1.234","anchor":"filenames-and-mcp-content-types-are-escaped-in-the-transcrip","canonical_anchor":"filenames-and-mcp-content-types-are-escaped-in-the-transcrip","heading":"Filenames and MCP content types are escaped in the transcript","tier":"notice","area":"Transcript","scope":null,"heads_up":null,"url":"https:\/\/changelogs.core-directive.com\/v\/2.1.234\/e\/filenames-and-mcp-content-types-are-escaped-in-the-transcrip","release_url":"https:\/\/changelogs.core-directive.com\/v\/2.1.234","markdown":"### Filenames and MCP content types are escaped in the transcript\n\nFilenames and MCP content types are escaped in the transcript, closing a text-injection route.\n\n**What**\n\nThe message recorded when you open a file in the IDE now escapes the filename, and the content type reported by an MCP server for binary results is escaped before being shown as `[Binary content: \u2026]`. This narrows a path by which a crafted filename or server-supplied metadata could inject text into the conversation.\n\n**Evidence**\n\n`The user opened the file `\n\n- Area: Transcript\n- Tier: You'll notice\n- Useful: 2\/5\n- Signal: 2\/5"}