{"version":"2.1.191","anchor":"linux-automount-net-path-protection","canonical_anchor":"linux-automount-net-path-protection","heading":"Linux Automount \/net Path Protection","tier":null,"area":null,"scope":null,"heads_up":null,"url":"https:\/\/changelogs.core-directive.com\/v\/2.1.191\/e\/linux-automount-net-path-protection","release_url":"https:\/\/changelogs.core-directive.com\/v\/2.1.191","markdown":"### Linux Automount \/net Path Protection\n\nWhat changed: Claude Code now detects and requires manual approval for any read or glob request touching the Linux automount `-hosts` map (paths under `\/net\/\u2026`). Previously only Windows UNC paths were blocked this way.\n\n**Details**\n\n- Accessing `\/net\/<hostname>\/...` silently triggers a DNS lookup and NFS mount to a remote host, which is a potential data-exfiltration and latency vector.\n- The new check fires before any other access control decision.\n- Message shown: `Claude requested permissions to read from <path>, which is under the \/net automount map and could trigger a DNS lookup and NFS mount to a remote host.`\n- Decision reason recorded: `\"Automount -hosts path detected (defense-in-depth check)\"`.\n- Both file reads and glob patterns are covered.\n- `\/proc\/net\/tcp` and `\/proc\/net\/tcp6` are also in scope (they reveal active network connections on Linux).\n\n**Evidence**\n\nAutomount path detector (search for `\"Automount -hosts path detected (defense-in-depth check)\"`)"}