{"version":"2.0.43","anchor":"enhanced-linux-sandbox-security-with-seccomp-filtering","canonical_anchor":"enhanced-linux-sandbox-security-with-seccomp-filtering","heading":"Enhanced Linux Sandbox Security with Seccomp Filtering","tier":null,"area":null,"scope":null,"heads_up":null,"url":"https:\/\/changelogs.core-directive.com\/v\/2.0.43\/e\/enhanced-linux-sandbox-security-with-seccomp-filtering","release_url":"https:\/\/changelogs.core-directive.com\/v\/2.0.43","markdown":"### Enhanced Linux Sandbox Security with Seccomp Filtering\n\n**What:** Linux sandboxing now blocks Unix domain socket creation using Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) seccomp filters, preventing sandboxed processes from bypassing network restrictions via local sockets.\n\n**How it works:** When network sandboxing is enabled on Linux, Claude Code automatically applies pre-compiled seccomp filters to block `socket(AF_UNIX, ...)` syscalls.\n\n**Details:**\n\n- Architecture-specific (x64\/arm64) pre-compiled BPF filters in `vendor\/seccomp\/` directories\n- `apply-seccomp` binary applies the filters to child processes\n- Functions: `Q$Q()` detects CPU architecture (x64\/arm64), `Ox1()` locates BPF filter files, `NiA()` finds the apply-seccomp binary\n- `I$Q()` retrieves the appropriate seccomp filter for the platform\n- Automatic cleanup via `dP6()` and `Rx1()` on process exit\n- 32-bit x86 (ia32) explicitly not supported due to `socketcall()` syscall complexity (line 1507)\n- Fallback: `allowAllUnixSockets` configuration option to disable seccomp filtering when needed (line 1693)\n- **Evidence**: `Q$Q()` at line ~1535, `Ox1()` for BPF filter location, `NiA()` for apply-seccomp binary discovery, seccomp integration at lines 1686-1693"}