{"version":"2.0.17","anchor":"windows-path-security-validation","canonical_anchor":"windows-path-security-validation","heading":"Windows Path Security Validation","tier":null,"area":null,"scope":null,"heads_up":null,"url":"https:\/\/changelogs.core-directive.com\/v\/2.0.17\/e\/windows-path-security-validation","release_url":"https:\/\/changelogs.core-directive.com\/v\/2.0.17","markdown":"### Windows Path Security Validation\n\n**What:** Enhanced security check that detects suspicious Windows-specific path patterns and requires manual approval before allowing file access.\n\n**How to use:** Automatic protection when Claude attempts to access files with suspicious paths. You'll receive a prompt like: > \"Claude requested permissions to read\/write to {path}, which contains a suspicious Windows path pattern that requires manual approval.\"\n\n**Details:**\n\n- Detects alternate data streams (`:` in paths beyond drive letter)\n- Detects short\/8.3 format names (`~1`, `~2` patterns used to bypass filters)\n- Detects long path prefixes (`\\\\?\\`, `\\\\.\\`) that can bypass security checks\n- Detects trailing dots or spaces that Windows ignores\n- Detects reserved device names (CON, PRN, AUX, NUL, COM1-9, LPT1-9)\n- Applies to both read and write permission checks\n- **Evidence**: `ZMQ() at line 454449`, integrated into `b41() at line 454621` and `op() at line 454708` (function and security checks completely absent from v2.0.15)"}